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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                         
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
  I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 These consolidated appeals present a confusing mosaic 
of bankruptcy petitions, motions for relief from the automatic 
stay, and nunc pro tunc rulings.  We must piece together what 
effect the rulings on relief have had as judgments were entered, 
as retroactive relief was granted, and as appeals were filed. The 
appeals all arise from an action for fraud and fraudulent 
conveyance brought by Constitution Bank ("ConBank") against 
defendants, Elliott A. Weinberg ("Weinberg"), Steven R. Tubbs 
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("Tubbs"), and Weinberg Tubbs & Co. ("WTC").  In Appeal No. 93-
1295, all three defendants have appealed the district court's 
order of February 26, 1993, which entered judgment against WTC 
for compensatory damages and against Weinberg and Tubbs for 
punitive damages.  In Appeal No. 94-1411, Weinberg has appealed 
the district court's order of March 24, 1994, which modified its 
February 26 judgment order by holding Weinberg and Tubbs to be 
jointly and severally liable with WTC for ConBank's compensatory 
damages, and in Appeal No. 94-1489, Tubbs has also appealed the 
district court's March 24 order.     
  II.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On September 2, 1987, Grossman Weinberg and Associates, 
P.A. ("GWA"), a professional accounting corporation, borrowed 
$27,450 from ConBank in order to purchase computer and office 
equipment.  GWA executed a promissory note in favor of ConBank 
for $27,450.  The officers and directors of GWA, professional 
accountants Weinberg, Tubbs, Steven B. Grossman, William A. 
Cadmus and Doreen A. Gentile, personally guaranteed the loan. 
These guarantees provided that the accountants: 
intending to be legally bound, 
unconditionally, absolutely and irrevocably 
guarantee(s) and become(s) surety to Bank for 
the prompt payment of all sums now or 
hereafter due to Bank from Borrower . . .. 
 
    *      *      * 
 
 The Obligation of Guarantor hereunder 
shall continue in full force and effect until 
thirty (30) days after Bank shall have 
actually received written notice of 
Guarantor's intention to terminate this 
Guaranty sent by certified or registered 
4 
mail, return receipt requested.  This 
Guaranty shall nevertheless continue in 
effect and Guarantor shall remain liable for 
any Obligation which was incurred by Borrower 
prior to such date of termination, and which 
is the result of any renewal, extension, or 
modification of any such Obligation . . .. 
App. A-1055-591 (emphasis added).  In support of their personal 
guarantees, each of the accountants submitted a financial 
statement to ConBank.   
 GWA then obtained a line of credit with ConBank and 
over the next two years borrowed an additional $250,000.  During 
the course of their dealing, GWA was represented to ConBank as 
being a single accounting firm with offices in both New Jersey 
and Florida.  In actuality, however, GWA's two "offices" were 
separate corporations having the same name and, for the most 
part, the same officers and directors.2 
 In July 1990, unbeknownst to ConBank, defendants 
Weinberg and Tubbs resigned from GWA and formed WTC, a competing 
                                                           
1
 Appendix references from Appeals No. 93-1295 and 94-1489 will 
be referred to as "App. A-  ; appendix references from Appeal No. 
94-1411 will be referred to as "App. B-  ". 
2
  In their brief in Appeal No. 93-1295, defendants state that: 
"[e]ach of the shareholders [Tubbs, Weinberg, Grossman, Cadmus 
and Gentile] were directors in each corporations[, and] . . . 
each shareholder was an officer in each corporation but held 
different offices."  Moreover, Weinberg testified that as of 
October 1989 the New Jersey and Florida GWA corporations had 
"maintained for the most part common officers, directors and 
shareholders and have operated co-existing practices involving 
accounting and other related services rendered by CPAs, 
accountants and other support staff."  App. A-190-92.  Tubbs also 
testified as to the overlap of shareholders between the two 
corporations, stating that from 1987 to July of 1990, the 
shareholders common to both the New Jersey and Florida GWA 
corporations were Grossman, Cadmus, Tubbs and Weinberg (because 
Gentile was not a CPA she held only an equity interest), but that 
Bartnick was a shareholder in the Florida GWA corporation only.  
App. A-258. 
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accounting firm.  At the same time, Weinberg and Tubbs 
transferred roughly $1 million in assets from GWA to WTC.   
  Sometime between October 1990 and March 1991, GWA 
defaulted on its loans.  In June 1991, the Court of Common Pleas 
for Philadelphia County entered judgment in favor of ConBank and 
against defendants Weinberg and Tubbs on their personal 
guarantees.   
 On November 8, 1991, ConBank filed an action in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, seeking to recover compensatory and punitive 
damages caused by defendants' allegedly fraudulent conduct in 
guaranteeing $277,450 in loans for GWA and then conveying away 
assets so that ConBank would be unable to collect from GWA.3  In 
March 1992, the court held a bifurcated jury trial on the 
defendants' liability for fraud and fraudulent conveyance.  The 
jury returned a bifurcated verdict in favor of ConBank as to 
liability only.  On March 13, 1992, the district court entered 
judgment on liability against the defendants. 
 Shortly thereafter, on March 31, 1992, the district 
court dismissed ConBank's complaint with prejudice on the basis 
of a purported settlement agreement between the parties.  When 
the settlement fell through, ConBank sought to vacate the 
dismissal.  On August 6, 1992, the court entered an order denying 
ConBank's motion to vacate, without prejudice to renew, but 
                                                           
3
  Although ConBank had also named GWA-New Jersey, GWA-Florida, 
Cadmus, Gentile and William A. Cadmus & Company as defendants in 
its complaint, those defendants were dismissed prior to trial. 
6 
permitting ConBank to show cause why the court should not give 
full force and effect to the judgment ConBank had obtained in the 
Court of Common Pleas in June 1991.  After a hearing, the court, 
on November 30, 1992, vacated its prior dismissal order and 
directed that the case be reassigned to another judge for trial 
on the issue of damages. 
 On January 27, 1993, a new judge empaneled two juries 
to hear the case -- one to decide damages only and the other to 
decide both liability and damages in the event that the first 
judgment of liability obtained on March 12, 1992, would be 
reversed.  On February 3, both juries returned verdicts in favor 
of ConBank and against the defendants.  The court then molded the 
verdict of the second jury (the one that decided both liability 
and damages) as follows: 
In favor of the plaintiff and against Elliott 
Weinberg for punitive damages in the amount 
of $48,000, and in favor of Elliott Weinberg 
and against plaintiff, as to compensatory 
damages; in favor of plaintiff, and against 
Steven Tubbs for punitive damages in the 
amount of $72,000, and in favor of Steven 
Tubbs [and] against plaintiff for 
compensatory damages; and in favor of 
plaintiff and against Weinberg Tubbs and Co., 
PA in the amount of $355,075, plus reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs [-- w]hich sum will 
be further molded after a hearing on February 
26, 1993. 
App. B-155.  No judgment order was entered at that time.   
 On February 26, the district court held the hearing to 
impose counsel fees.  In the meantime, on February 16, Tubbs had 
filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the Southern District 
of Florida.  Notice of his bankruptcy was filed in the district 
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court on February 19.  On February 26, approximately one and a 
half hours before the district court hearing, Weinberg filed a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the Southern District of 
Florida. 
 At the February 26 hearing, defense counsel contended 
that the court did not have the ability to enter judgment without 
a grant of relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§362(a).  The district court disagreed, holding that judgment had 
been entered on February 3, when the court first molded the 
jury's verdict, and that the formal entry of judgment did not 
violate the automatic stay.   
 After determining the proper award of attorney's fees 
and costs to be $282,962.22, the court entered judgment nunc pro 
tunc to February 3, 1993, when the jury's verdict was originally 
molded by the court.  The February 26 order awarded ConBank 
$48,000 in "punitive damages only" against Weinberg, $72,000 in 
"punitive damages only" against Tubbs, and $355,075 in 
compensatory damages plus $282,962.22 for attorney's fees and 
costs against WTC.  App. A-980-81.  Although the court signed the 
judgment on February 26, it was not entered until March 1.  
 On March 16, 1993, WTC filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petition in the Southern District of Florida.   
 On March 29, defendants Weinberg, Tubbs, and WTC filed 
a notice of appeal from the February 26 judgment order (Appeal 
No. 93-1295).  In that appeal, defendants asserted that the 
district court erred (1) by denying their Rule 50(a) motion for 
judgment as a matter of law because there was no evidence of the 
8 
essential elements of fraud, there was insufficient evidence to 
support the jury's finding of fraud, and there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's award of punitive damages against 
Weinberg and Tubbs; (2) by failing to acknowledge the preclusive 
effect of the state court judgement against Weinberg and Tubbs; 
and (3) by improperly charging the jury.  On May 17, 1993, this 
Court entered an order staying Appeal No. 93-1295, pending either 
the termination of the bankruptcy proceedings or an order from 
the bankruptcy court lifting the automatic stay with regard to 
the appeal.   
 ConBank filed a motion for relief from the automatic 
stay in Weinberg's bankruptcy action in order to pursue a motion 
to clarify the district court's February 26, 1993, judgment order 
regarding Weinberg's liability for compensatory damages.  After 
oral argument, the bankruptcy court on December 29, 1993, granted 
ConBank's motion for relief from stay.4   
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  At the same time, the bankruptcy court found that the award of 
punitive damages against Weinberg was non-dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.  ConBank also urged the bankruptcy court to hold that 
the jury's findings that Weinberg committed fraud required the 
bankruptcy court to hold that the amount that Weinberg owed under 
his guaranty agreement (pursuant to the Pennsylvania state court 
judgment) was obtained by fraud and was therefore also non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy.  The court, however, declined to 
hold that any debt based upon the Pennsylvania state court breach 
of contract action (for breach of Weinberg's guaranty agreement 
to ConBank) was dischargeable in bankruptcy.  It did so without 
prejudice, however, "pending a final decision in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania . 
. . address[ing] the lack of any compensatory damages awarded 
against Defendant Weinberg."  App. A-997.  Noting that "the jury 
specifically found all the elements of fraud and specifically 
found conduct justifying an award of punitive damages," a finding 
the court deemed to be "inconsistent" with the jury's failure to 
award compensatory damages against Weinberg, the bankruptcy court 
9 
 As a result of the grant of relief from stay, on 
January 27, 1994, ConBank filed a motion in the district court 
for clarification of the February 26 order, seeking to have that 
order amended to reflect that Weinberg, Tubbs, and WTC were 
jointly and severally liable for the compensatory damages awarded 
by the jury.  The district court held oral argument on ConBank's 
motion, and on March 24, 1994, the court granted it, altering its 
original judgment order to impose joint and several liability on 
Weinberg, Tubbs, and WTC for ConBank's compensatory damages.   
 The district court amended its order with respect to 
Tubbs, even though Tubbs did not receive notice or an opportunity 
to be heard at the March 11 argument on ConBank's motion to 
clarify.  Moreover, the court acted against Tubbs at the 
suggestion of ConBank's counsel, even though ConBank's counsel 
had earlier assured Tubbs that ConBank would not seek 
compensatory damages against him by its motion to clarify the 
judgment with respect to Weinberg.  The district court held that 
the modification of the award was necessary to further the 
interests of justice because the jury's answers to 
interrogatories had established that the fraud by Weinberg and 
Tubbs had caused ConBank to suffer the compensatory damages. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
granted ConBank relief from stay to seek clarification of the 
lack of compensatory damages against Weinberg.  App. B-371.  
Thus, presumably if the district court determined that Weinberg 
was liable for compensatory damages, the bankruptcy court would 
find the amount owed on his guaranty agreement to be non-
dischargeable. 
10 
 Weinberg and Tubbs both appealed the district court's 
order of March 24, 1994.  On April 6, Weinberg filed Appeal No. 
94-1411 and, on April 25, Tubbs filed Appeal No. 94-1489.  
 On April 24, 1994, ConBank went back to the Florida 
bankruptcy court seeking relief from the automatic stay with 
respect to defendant Weinberg in order to pursue the present 
appeals.  On April 27, the Weinberg bankruptcy court granted 
ConBank's motion, nunc pro tunc, to provide retroactive relief 
from stay to cover Weinberg's pursuit of appeals in Nos. 93-1295 
and 94-1411. 
 On June 6, 1994, Tubbs filed a motion to consolidate 
all three appeals.  Defendants Weinberg and WTC made similar 
motions.  Also on June 6, Tubbs filed a motion in this Court to 
terminate the stay of Appeal No. 93-1295.  Tubbs informed us that 
he had a pending motion before the Florida bankruptcy court for 
relief from the automatic stay in order to pursue Appeal No. 93-
1295.  On July 15, 1994, the bankruptcy court granted Tubbs 
relief from the stay, stating that Tubbs "is free to proceed in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in case 
No. 93-1295."  The bankruptcy court did not, however, grant Tubbs 
any relief from the stay in Appeal No. 94-1489. 
 On August 1, 1994, we entered an order for the appeals 
to proceed because "the automatic stay" had been lifted.  We also 
granted defendants' motions to consolidate the appeals.    
 For purposes of resolving the present appeals, we 
assume that all of defendants' bankruptcies are still pending.   
11 
      III.  DISCUSSION 
            THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
 
 
 Before addressing the merits of defendants' appeals, we 
must examine the effect of the automatic stays which arose at the 
filing of each defendant's bankruptcy petition, pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 362.5  When interpreting and applying the legal precepts 
underlying the bankruptcy court's automatic stay, we apply 
plenary review.  Maritime Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 
F.2d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir. 1991).  Because the granting of relief 
or the failure to request relief from the automatic stay, 
triggered by defendants' bankruptcies, present questions about 
our jurisdiction to consider aspects of these appeals, we note 
that we have "inherent power and a continuing obligation to  
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  Section 362 provides in part: 
 
Automatic Stay. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of 
this section, a petition filed under section 
301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . operates 
as a stay, applicable to all entities, of -- 
(1) the commencement or 
continuation, including the 
issuance or employment of process, 
of a judicial, administrative, or 
other action or proceeding against 
the debtor that was or could have 
been commenced before the 
commencement of the case under this 
title, or to recover a claim 
against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case 
under this title. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).  Subsection (b) enumerates specific 
exceptions to the automatic stay rule - none of which apply here.  
12 
determine [our] own jurisdiction."  Id. at 1198 (citations 
omitted).  
 The purpose of the automatic stay is twofold:  (1) to 
protect the debtor, by stopping all collection efforts, 
harassment, and foreclosure actions, thereby giving the debtor a 
respite from creditors and a chance "to attempt a repayment or 
reorganization plan or simply be relieved of the financial 
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy;" and (2) to protect 
"creditors by preventing particular creditors from acting 
unilaterally in self-interest to obtain payment from a debtor to 
the detriment of other creditors."  Maritime, 959 F.2d at 1204.  
 The stay is "automatic" because it is triggered  upon 
the filing of a bankruptcy petition regardless of whether the 
other parties to the stayed proceeding are aware that a petition 
has been filed.  The automatic stay cannot be waived.  Relief 
from the stay can be granted only by the bankruptcy court having 
jurisdiction over a debtor's case.  Id.  A party in interest may 
obtain relief from stay, pursuant to § 362(d)(1), by requesting 
the relief from the bankruptcy court and, after notice and a 
hearing, showing cause.  11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).   
 The automatic stay is of broad scope, directing that 
"[a]ll judicial actions against a debtor seeking recovery on a 
claim that were or could have been brought before commencement of 
a bankruptcy case, are automatically stayed."  Maritime, 959 F.2d 
at 1203, 1206.  Thus, "[o]nce triggered by a debtor's bankruptcy 
petition, the automatic stay suspends any non-bankruptcy court's 
authority to continue judicial proceedings then pending against 
13 
the debtor."  Id. at 1206.  Unless relief from the stay is 
granted, the stay continues until the bankruptcy case is 
dismissed or closed, or discharge is granted or denied.  11 
U.S.C. § 362(c).  Once a stay is in effect, without relief from 
the bankruptcy court, "the parties themselves [can]not validly 
undertake any judicial action material to the . . . claim 
against" the debtor.  Id. at 1207.  This includes the filing of 
motions, which are void ab initio, unless the bankruptcy court 
later grants retroactive relief.6  Id. at 1207, n.13.   
 There is no question that the present appeals arise 
from an action originally brought by ConBank against the three 
debtor defendants.  This is the type of action that triggered the 
automatic stay provision of section 362 when each defendant filed 
a petition for bankruptcy.  At that time the automatic stay arose 
and suspended the competence of the district court and of the 
parties to continue with the proceedings against that defendant. 
As a consequence, we must consider whether the appeals have been 
affected by the automatic stays, thereby depriving us of the 
authority to proceed.  We address the appeals in turn. 
   A.  STEVEN TUBBS 
       1.   Appeal No. 93-1295 
                                                           
6
  Generally, judicial actions and proceedings against the debtor 
are void ab initio absent relief from the stay.  Id.  We have, 
however, recognized that section 362(d), which requires the 
bankruptcy court to grant relief from the stay under certain 
circumstances and permits such relief to be applied 
retroactively, would allow the bankruptcy court to grant 
annulment of a stay, thereby making acts in violation of the stay 
voidable, rather than void ab initio.  See In re Siciliano, 13 
F.3d 748, 750-51 (3d Cir. 1994).  
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 On February 16, 1993, defendant Tubbs triggered the 
automatic stay by filing a petition for bankruptcy.  Because the 
automatic stay was effective as soon as the petition was filed, 
the district court was without authority to act against Tubbs at 
the February 26 hearing or to issue its judgment order against 
him.  However, despite Tubbs' contention that no action could be 
taken against him because of the automatic stay, the court 
entered judgment against Tubbs on punitive damages and in favor 
of Tubbs on compensatory damages nunc pro tunc to February 3, 
1993, the date of the jury verdict.  The February 26 judgment was 
docketed on March 1, 1993.7  Tubbs and his co-defendants filed 
Appeal No. 93-1295 on March 29, 1993.  Because the stay of 
proceedings against Tubbs was effective automatically when his 
bankruptcy petition was filed, the district court was without 
authority to act against Tubbs at the February 26 hearing or to 
effectively enter a judgment order against him.   
 The district court's issuing of its February 26 
judgment order nunc pro tunc to February 3, a date prior to the 
triggering of the automatic stay, was, therefore, of no effect. 
Several courts have applied the void ab initio rule to nullify 
judgments entered after a stay has been triggered, even when the 
only action left for the court was to enter the judgment.  See, 
e.g., In re Capitol-York Constr. Corp., 43 B.R. 52 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1984); Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Triple "I" Ins. 
                                                           
7
  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, a judgment is not 
effective until it is set forth on a separate document and 
entered in accordance with Rule 79(a), which requires docketing 
of the judgment. 
15 
Servs., 727 P.2d 336 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc); Chapliski v. 
Churchill Coal Corp., 503 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1985).   
 Although not controlling, the Chapliski case is on 
point.  In Chapliski, plaintiff and defendant entered into a 
stipulation on June 18, 1981, requiring defendant to pay 
plaintiff a specified sum of money.  On June 29, defendant filed 
a petition for bankruptcy, thereby triggering the automatic stay. 
Defendant failed to notify either plaintiff or the court of his 
bankruptcy petition.  On July, 7, the court entered a judgment 
order, incorporating the stipulation, against defendant.  In that 
order, the court specified that the judgment was entered nunc pro 
tunc to June 29, before defendant's petition for bankruptcy had 
been filed.  On those facts, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
found that the plain meaning of § 362(a) compelled it to hold 
that the automatic stay barred the lower court on July 7 from 
entering the retroactive order.  Id. at 2.  
 The present case is similar to Chapliski.  We agree 
with the Pennsylvania court's reasoning.  As we recognized in 
Maritime, 959 F.2d at 1206, once in effect, the automatic stay 
"suspends any non-bankruptcy court's authority to continue 
judicial proceedings" against the debtor.  The district court's 
entry of judgment against Tubbs amounts to a continuation of 
judicial proceedings against him.  Since the very act of entering 
the February 26 order was in violation of the stay, the fact that 
the order itself specified that it was to be effective nunc pro 
tunc could not save it.  Thus, we conclude that the district 
16 
court could not enter an order against Tubbs after the stay had 
taken effect and the judgment was void ab initio.   
 On July 15, 1994, the bankruptcy court granted Tubbs' 
motion for relief from the stay in order to pursue Appeal No. 93-
1295.  However, the bankruptcy court has never granted relief 
from the stay in the district court, either prospective or 
retroactive,  so that the February 26 judgment could be entered 
against Tubbs. For this reason, there is nothing from which to 
appeal because no valid judgment order has yet been entered 
against Tubbs in the district court. 
       2.   Appeal No. 94-1489 
 Tubbs filed Appeal No. 94-1489 for review of the 
district court's clarification order of March 24, 1994.  However, 
as with the February 26 order, no relief from the stay has been 
granted in the district court to permit entry of the March 24 
judgment against Tubbs.  Moreover, although the Florida 
bankruptcy court granted Tubbs relief from the stay to pursue 
Appeal No. 93-1295, no mention is made in the relief order of 
Appeal No. 94-1489.  Tubbs' appeal in No. 94-1489 is void ab 
initio.   
17 
       B.  ELLIOTT WEINBERG 
       1.  Appeal No. 93-1295 
 On February 26, 1993, Weinberg filed a petition for 
bankruptcy, thereby triggering the automatic stay.  One hour and 
a half later, the district court began its hearing to mold the 
jury's verdict.  For the reasons discussed above with respect to 
Tubbs, the district court's entry of its February 26 judgment as 
nunc pro tunc to February 3 does not alter our conclusion that 
the act of entering the judgment was in violation of the 
automatic stay against Weinberg.     
 The bankruptcy court's first grant of relief from the 
stay in the Weinberg bankruptcy occurred on December 29, 1993, 
when the court granted relief so that ConBank could clarify the 
district court's February 26, 1993, judgment order.  This grant 
of relief to consider the February 26 order lifted the stay as to 
that order insofar as it applied to Weinberg.  In the March 24, 
1994, clarifying order, the district court entered both the 
February 26 order and its clarification for the first time 
against Weinberg. 
 In its second grant of relief from stay on April 27, 
1994, the bankruptcy court granted relief, nunc pro tunc, "to 
allow . . . Weinberg to prosecute the appeal that has been filed 
before the Third Circuit . . . of the trial court's underlying . 
. . February 26, 1993" judgment.  Accordingly, Weinberg's Appeal 
No. 93-1295 would be properly before this Court for review of the 
February 26 judgment order, except for one problem.  In view of 
the fact that the Febru____26 order could not be entered against 
18 
Tubbs, it is not a final order and is not appealable.  See 
Maritime, 959 F.2d at 1208.  Nor has there been a Fed. R. Civ. P. 
Rule 54(b) certification in this case to permit us to hear 
Weinberg's appeal.   
 For these reasons, not only do we not have Tubbs' 
appeal before us, but we cannot consider the issues raised by 
Weinberg on the merits of the February 26 order.  We do not have 
appellate jurisdiction because there is no final order.  This is 
true, as we noted in Maritime, even though this jurisdictional 
problem was not briefed by the parties.  Id. 
       2.  Appeal No. 94-1411 
 The Florida bankruptcy court's order of April 24, 1994, 
also granted retroactive relief from the stay to permit the 
filing of the Appeal No. 94-1411, seeking review of the March 24, 
1994, order.  However, as with Appeal No. 93-1295, we do not have 
jurisdiction because the March 24 order is void ab initio as to 
Tubbs and is for that reason not a final order and not 
appealable.   
   C.  WTC 
 On March 16, 1993, WTC triggered the automatic stay 
provision of § 362(a) by filing its petition for bankruptcy. 
Because WTC's bankruptcy action is still pending, the stay 
remains in effect unless the bankruptcy court has granted relief 
from it.  No party has submitted any evidence that the bankruptcy 
court has granted such relief in order to permit WTC to pursue 
its present appeal (No. 93-1295), or for any other reason. 
19 
Therefore, even if we did not jurisdiction to hear the Tubbs and 
Weinberg appeals, we could not hear WTC's. 
  IV.  CONCLUSION 
 The moral of this story is that one accomplishes little 
in obtaining relief from the automatic stay to appeal a judgment 
if that judgment was not a final one because of failure to lift 
the automatic stay in order to enter the judgment against all 
parties.  We will, for the reasons stated above, dismiss these 
appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
 
